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I. ARGUMENT 
In this action the City of Moab (City) asserts four points of error with 
respect to the decision of the trial court to reverse the City's denial of the 
conditional use permit in question: a) the trial court incorrectly applied the so-
called public clamor doctrine as it pertained to the administrative decision of the 
City Council; b) the court erred by failing to affirm the decision where the City 
found the application to be contrary to the mandatory terms of its comprehensive 
plan; c) the court erred in failing to order a remand for clarifying findings; and d) 
the court misapplied the standard of review by engaging in its own fact-finding. 
This brief will focus on the public clamor doctrine and the current procedural 
posture of the case. The City incorporates by reference the arguments previously 
advanced as to all points of error, as set forth in its Opening Brief and Reply Brief, 
and submits that reversal is warranted with respect to those arguments. 
1. PUBLIC CLAMOR AS A REASON FOR INVALIDATING A LAND 
USE DECISION MUST BE PREDICATED UPON 
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT, OR SERIOUS PROCEDURAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
The concept of public clamor as a basis for setting aside an adjudicatory land 
use decision traces back to this Court's decision in Thurston v. Cache County, 626 
P .2d 440 (Utah 1981 ). In that case this court rejected a public clamor argument 
and held, inter alia, that a county government's reliance upon testimony from 
1 
neighboring landowners in the denial of a conditional use permit was proper where 
the testimony was of an advisory nature. Id. at 445. The Court noted that though 
the consent of neighboring property owners may not be a criterion for issuance or 
denial of a land use permit, there is nothing wrong with reliance upon such 
testimony through the public hearing process 1• Id. Implicit in that decision was 
the concept that the local government must not cede its independence to those who 
support or oppose a given application, and that public testimony may be 
"advisory." Id. 
Public clamor has subsequently been applied by lower courts to invalidate 
local land use decisions where there was evidence of procedural misconduct by the 
local government, or where public opposition was motivated by improper factors 
outside the ambit of a zoning ordinance, such as a desire to exclude the mentally 
ill. Reply Brief, pp. 11-13; citing: Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 
(Utah App. 1988); Uintah Mountain RTC, LLC v. Duchesne County, 127 P.3d 
1270 (Utah App. 2005). Both decisions relied in part on this Court's ruling in 
Thurston County, and both were in general agreement with the United States 
1 Similarly, this Court has recognized that a local government may properly rely 
upon all manner of public testimony when it acts in a legislative context, such as a 
rezoning decision. Gay/and v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 635-636 (Utah 
1961). 
2 
Supreme Court decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 4 73 U.S. 
432 (1985). 
The instant case presents none of the invalidating causes for government 
action, such as procedural irregularities, or discriminatory motives, as found in 
Davis County or Uintah Mountain RTC. Nevertheless, the trial court erred by 
conflating public opposition focused on the approval criteria of the land use code 
with improper clamor. This illustrates that lower courts need clearer guidance as 
to when public testimony in a land use case crosses the line into improper clamor. 
In the absence of clarification there is a genuine risk that the doctrine of clamor 
will undermine constitutionally protected speech by those who seek to challenge 
land use applications. 
a. Clarification of the Thurston County Rule is Appropriate. 
Although this court abides by its precedent, stare decisis is neither 
mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last resort. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 399 (Utah 1994). And, precedent may be modified where it is unpersuasive, 
not firmly rooted, or likely to become inconsistent with other principles of law. 
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553, if22, ,J40 (Utah 2015). Indeed, where a rule 
of law has a chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech, or is otherwise in 
tension with First Amendment principles, that is a reason to abandon the precedent. 
Id. at ,r 53, 54. 
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b. Lower Courts Misapply Thurston County in a Manner that 
Infringes Upon First Amendment Freedoms. 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that 
citizens have the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, and this 
right to petition extends to efforts to influence the result of a local government land 
use decision. Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, ~ 26-28 (Utah 
2005 ); Reply Brief pp. 10-11. Despite the constitutionally rooted nature of public 
testimony in land use proceedings, there is at least some authority which 
misapplies the public clamor concept to exclude or minimize the effect of public 
testimony. 
In this case the Appellee property owners (Owners) place a great reliance 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals opinion in Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction, Inc. 
v. West Jordan City, 999 P .2d 1240 (Utah App. 2000), which they cite for the 
proposition that a decision to deny a conditional use permit may not be based 
solely on adverse public comment. Id. at~ 17; Appellees' Response Brief, pp. 44-
452. This conclusion is erroneous, as this Court in Thurston County held that it is 
appropriate that a local government hear and rely upon just such testimony. 
Thurston County, 626 P.2d at 445. Nonetheless, the argument shows that lower 
2 Wadsworth Construction contains questionable reasoning and, in any event, is not 
binding upon this Court. 
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courts are applying the concept of public clamor in a manner that infringes upon 
the constitutionally mandated right to petition. 
The dispute shows that the boundaries of the public clamor doctrine must be 
clearly defined so that fundamental First Amendment freedoms to speak and, more 
importantly, to have one's concerns acted upon, are not displaced by a de facto 
exclusionary rule as to public testimony. In fact, the Owners in this case urge just 
such a rule of exclusion as to public testimony. See Response Brief, p. 45. 
A local government must be able to consider and give consideration to all 
credible testimony in an adjudicatory proceeding, and it may rely upon public 
testimony in reaching its decision unless there is a basis for invalidating that action 
under the doctrine of clamor. Any other conclusion would tum land use 
adjudicatory proceedings into an empty gesture, where the concerns of affected 
persons are heard and summarily ignored. 
c. Improper Motive is Established by Bias or Reliance Upon Factors 
which are Not Founded in the Land Use Code. 
An appropriate formulation of the public clamor doctrine requires that a 
court reviewing an adjudicatory decision of a land use authority may only find that 
the decision is the product of improper public clamor where: a) the decision is 
motivated by prejudice or improper motive; or b) the land use authority engages in 
serious procedural misconduct which confirms the presence of bias, or which 
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comprises the fairness of the proceeding3• The two elements are discussed 
separately. 
1. Bias or Improper Purpose May Constitute Clamor. 
Zoning and planning authority is vested in local governments for the 
purpose of promoting public health, safety, prosperity, morals, peace, general 
welfare, and good order. U.C.A. § 10-9a-102; see also, Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 
141 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1943). But, where a local government engages in land 
use decision making which is attenuated from its legitimate purposes, such that it 
gives effect to bias or irrational fears directed at a disfavored group, then it acts 
irrationally and an adjudicatory land use decision will be struck down. City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). Thus, while local 
governments can address concerns of public safety or welfare, they cannot give 
effect to public distaste or prejudice. Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 
.. 
311 ( 4th Cir. l 989)(invalidating denial of conditional use permit for operation of 
palmistry shop where decision was motivated by irrational public and religious 
concerns); accord Davis v. Clearfield City, 7 56 P. 2d at 712 (noting near uniform 
public opposition when a mental health facility or jail is proposed, and identifying 
3 As stated, this formulation of public clamor is entirely consistent with the 
statutory standard of review, which requires that an adjudicatory decision be 
supported by substantial evidence and not be arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
U.C.A. § 10-9a-801(3)(c). 
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the decision as pretext for that opposition). Land use decisions founded on bias or 
prejudice against a disfavored group may amount to improper clamor. 
Conversely, where a local government acts on the basis of legitimate zoning 
concerns such as noise, access, parking, traffic, or the suitability of a proposed use 
for a given neighborhood, the action is proper, even if a source of evidence is 
testimony from interested members of the public. E.g. Thurston v. Cache County, 
626 P .2d at 444-445. 
ii. Serious Procedural Misconduct May Evidence Clamor. 
At its core, improper clamor as a basis for setting aside a land use decision 
rests on the notion that a local government acted pursuant to a pretext to give effect 
to private bias. Markers for this kind of conduct may include procedural 
irregularities. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals found public clamor where there 
was evidence of secret closed-door meetings by the land use authority in which the 
application was considered. Davis v. Clearfield County, 756 P.2d at 711-712; 
Reply Brief, pp. 11-14. Likewise, in that case the court noted that the planning 
commission yielded to public sentiment by asking for a show of hands of persons 
at a hearing to measure support or opposition to the application. Id. at F .N. 9. 
Again, those facts suggest that public officials have ceded their official duties to 
the public, rather than acting independently on the basis of their own judgment. 
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The rule to be gleaned from these authorities is that when public opposition 
to a land use matter is accompanied by significant procedural irregularities, it is 
proper for a court to infer that the decision was the product of public clamor. 
d. The City Acted Properly to Weigh the Testimony Against the 
Criteria in the Ordinance. 
In the review of an adjudicatory proceeding this Court owes no deference to 
the trial court decision, which is not accorded any presumption of correctness. 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P. 3d 1208, ~ 17 (Utah 2004 ). Under the correct 
formulation of the public clamor doctrine the decision by the Moab City Council 
easily stands up to review. See Reply Brief, pp. 14-16. 
There is no evidence in this case that the City acted on the basis of a 
discriminatory motive, nor were there any procedural irregularities in the review 
process that would suggest bias or improper clamor. The record discloses staff 
level review, followed by hearings before the Planning Commission and City 
Council. The Owners reviewed a number of comments from the public and 
submitted their own written rebuttal prior to the final decision. R. 0320-0321. 
There was genuine debate on the City Council followed by a 3-1 vote against the 
application. R. 0371-380; R.0408-0411. Prior to the vote, one Council member 
noted that the application did not comply with the mandatory provisions of the 
City's General Plan, a fact which would justify denial even in the absence of any 
public testimony. R. 0380-0381; Reply Brief, p 6. This record hardly suggests a 
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wholesale capitulation of a local government to the unreasoned sentiments of the 
public. 
Moreover, review of the application was based on the substantive criteria in 
the Moab ordinances, which are strict when it comes to the expansion of business 
activities in residential neighborhoods. Public testimony focused on the criteria in 
the conditional use ordinance, and pointed out likely noise, traffic, and crowding 
impacts, as well as the concern that the proposed use was not compatible with the 
neighborhood4• Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, pp. 3-10. Some of this 
testimony was quite specific, noting, for example, the projected increase in traffic 
and evidence that noise emissions from off highway vehicles coming and going 
from the site would likely exceed City noise ordinance levels. See Reply Brief, pp. 
15-165. Despite having the burden of proof, the Owners did little to rebut these 
statements; nor did they suggest conditions that would mitigate the likely impacts 
of the project. R.0320-0321 (Owners rebuttal statement). The evidence was 
sufficient to convince the City Council that the use was not compatible with the 
site. 
4 Compatibility of a proposed use with existing uses in a neighborhood is a valid 
approval condition, and does not amount to a "neighborhood veto" as to a land use 
approval. See Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App. 1994); 
citing: Thurston v. Cache County. 
5 In the interest of space, the City will not repeat that testimony here. 
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II. CONCLUSION 
This case reflects a careful, if imperfect, attempt by the City of Moab to 
evaluate a land use application based on the evidence in the record. There was no 
conduct to suggest that the City abandoned its role as independent decision maker 
or buckled to the unreasoned prejudice of a mob. This case does not present a 
decision based on pretext to conceal an improper motive or discriminatory 
purpose. Rather, this case illustrates that this Court must affirm that the public has 
an important role in adjudicatory land use proceedings, and that public testimony 
focused on zoning criteria cannot be dismissed as improper or "mere clamor." 
The decision of the trial court must therefore be reversed. 
III. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The City of Moab hereby requests oral argument in this appeal. 
Submitted this 7th day of February, 2017. 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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